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Abstract
Capital flows with low intensity and flows to middle-income countries. Phys-
ical and human capital alone cannot explain this pattern. I present a model to
show how managerial ability– the ability to run risky projects– can increase
total factor productivity and explain the pattern of capital flows. The model
implies that countries with more high-ability managers use more risky projects
and have higher productivity. I define proxies for managerial ability with data
on physical and human capital, schooling, and entrepreneurship. Consistent
with the pattern of capital flows, the model predicts similar returns to capital
across countries and higher returns in middle-income countries.
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This paper shows how managerial ability can increase total factor productivity
and explain the pattern of capital flows. Capital flows with low intensity and flows
to middle-income countries. We can explain this pattern if returns to capital are
similar across countries and higher in middle-income countries. Physical capital and
human capital alone cannot explain the variation of output across countries and
cannot explain capital flows (Lucas 1990, Caselli 2005, among others). I calibrate the
model and calculate returns to capital with different proxies for managerial ability.
As needed to explain the pattern of capital flows, I find returns to capital similar
across countries and higher in middle-income countries.1
I use the model of Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004). Imrohoroglu and Kumar explain
the low intensity of capital flows and the direction of capital flows with intermedia-
tion costs. I extend their framework to allow for different distributions of managerial
abilities and set the intermediation costs to zero. The motivation for this is that
intermediation costs have been decreasing with market deregulation and financial in-
novation but the pattern of capital flows has not changed. Capital continues to flow
with low intensity and to middle-income countries. The difference in conditions to
foster managerial abilities, however, is large and it is more diffi cult to revert. Can a
model without intermediation costs generate the same pattern: middle-income coun-
tries with higher returns? Surprisingly, only the differences in managerial abilities,
1The low intensity of capital flows refers to the observed capital flows compared to the predictions
of the neoclassical model on the returns to capital. The rich countries (those in the highest quartile of
capital per worker in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997) have 40 times the capital per worker of poor
countries (those in the lowest quartile). Given these differences in capital per worker, capital had
to flow fast from rich to poor countries. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, however, outflows minus inflows of foreign direct investment in 2004 from developed
countries (Australia, Israel, Japan, Malta, New Zealand, North America, and Western Europe by the
United Nations classification) were 250 billion dollars, or only 1 percent of the sum of GDP of these
countries. To see that capital flows to middle-income countries, the 50 least developed countries
received in 2004 only 3 percent of all inflows to developing countries (UNCTAD 2006).
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without the intermediation costs, are able to account for the pattern of capital flows.
One advantage of the model of Imrohoroglu and Kumar is to allow countries to
use the technology in different ways. Agents can produce output with a risky and
a safe technology. When we include the effects of managerial ability, countries with
more high-ability managers use the risky technology more intensively. The composi-
tion of risky and safe projects changes according to the distribution of abilities. The
technologies of risky and safe projects are available for all countries, but countries
with more high-ability managers use the technologies more effectively by using more
risky projects. In accordance with this prediction, if we interpret the safe technol-
ogy as traditional technologies and agriculture, Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that
poor countries use capital more heavily in natural-resource sectors and agriculture.
The model clarifies how countries with more high-ability managers use the available
technology more effectively.
In the model, managers decide to undertake risky or safe projects. The probability
of success in risky projects increases with managerial ability. If all countries have the
same distribution of managerial ability then the ranking of returns is the same as
in the neoclassical model: returns are higher in countries with less physical capital.
Accounting for managerial ability makes returns closer across countries and higher in
middle-income countries.
I use data on physical capital and human capital from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997), on years of education from Barro and Lee (2001), and on entrepreneurship
from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Reynolds et al. 2005) to define proxies
for managerial ability. When income and managerial ability are positively related,
returns in capital-rich countries can be higher than in countries with little capital.
Managerial ability overcomes the decrease in the marginal return to capital.
The model implies that total factor productivity (TFP) increases with managerial
ability. That is, returns increase, keeping physical and human capital constant, when
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managerial ability increases. Managerial ability works as an unmeasured component
of physical or human capital able to affect production. The purpose of the paper
is to understand how managerial ability can increase TFP. In particular, to explain
how managerial ability increases TFP in a way that (1) returns to capital are sim-
ilar across countries and (2) returns to capital are slightly higher in middle-income
countries to justify the flows of capital from rich and poor countries to middle-income
countries. Managerial ability is not, of course, the single explanation for differences
in TFP and for the pattern of capital flows. I interpret the probability of having a
successful risky project in the model as managerial ability. It can also be interpreted
as entrepreneurship, institutions or cognitive abilities that increase the likelihood of
having a successful project.
Why are managerial abilities different across countries? If managerial ability is
important, we should ask why individuals in poor countries decide not to improve
their managerial ability.2 What institutions encourage the acquisition of managerial
skills3? The focus of the paper is first to understand how managerial ability increases
TFP. The reason in the model is: more high ability managers imply a more heavily
use of risky projects. It is the change in the composition of safe and risky projects
that implies the reversal in the ranking of capital returns– with higher capital returns
in middle-income countries.
In the following three sections, I discuss the model, implications, and conclusions.
I discuss the evidence on managerial ability across countries in section 3. All proofs
are in the appendix.
2Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) also call attention to the question
of why there are differences in total factor productivity. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) provide
evidence that low capital flows can be explained by low productivity in poor countries. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2004), on the other hand, consider credit market risk.
3Murphy et al. (1991) discuss how institutions affect the allocation of talent to entrepreneurship.
Foster and Rosenzweig (1996, 2004) and Bils and Klenow (2000) discuss how expected growth
encourages schooling. In a similar way, expected growth and institutions could also encourage the
acquisition of managerial skills.
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2. THE MODEL: RISKY PROJECTS AND MANAGERIAL ABILITY
The main components of the model are intermediaries and managers who decide
to undertake safe or risky projects. The model is a version of the framework in
Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004).
There is a continuum of one-period lived, risk neutral managers, with measure
one. Their only endowment is human capital. They borrow physical capital from
intermediaries to fund their projects. There are two kinds of projects: a safe project
and a risky project. The technology of the safe project is y (k) = Akαh1−α where k is
physical capital per worker, h is human capital per worker, α is the physical capital
share and A is a productivity parameter. The technology of the risky project is
yH (k) = AHk
αh1−α if the project is successful, and yL (k) = ALkαh1−α if the project
fails, AH > A > AL ≥ 0.4
Each manager is indexed by the potential to succeed in the risky project, denoted
by a ∈ [0, 1]. I interpret the potential to succeed in the risky project as managerial
ability or entrepreneurship. A manager with ability a has probability π (a) of being
successful in the risky project. The probability π (a) increases with a. The outcome of
the safe project does not depend on managerial ability. Managerial ability is private
information. The distribution of abilities is given by F , with density function f .
Let x be a proxy for managerial ability. This assumption allows us to associate each
country with a distribution of managerial ability. x can be human capital, income,
entrepreneurship, or institutions that encourage agents to undertake risky projects
or to acquire management skills. In order to obtain analytical results, suppose that
the distribution F shifts to the right when x increases. That is, the cumulative
distribution of managerial ability F (·|x′) first order stochastic dominates F (·|x) when
4It is possible to write the model with risk averse managers. I use risk neutral managers to
simplify the model and obtain analytical solutions. With risk neutral managers, we can obtain more
intuition for the results, abstract from risk sharing, and focus on managerial ability.
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x′ > x. It is easier to find a high-ability manager when x is high.
Intermediaries pool project risk and guarantee a rate of return to capital r. Interme-
diation occurs within each period. Intermediaries cannot make contracts contingent
on managerial ability as ability is private information. For this reason, they offer
the quantity of capital kr and the interest rate rr for the managers who undertake
the risky project, and the interest rate rs for the managers who undertake the safe
project. Managers choose the quantity of capital in the safe project given the interest
rate rs. On the other hand, they have to use kr units of capital, to be determined
in equilibrium, if they undertake the risky project and pay the interest rate rr. The
intermediary appropriates the production if the project fails.5
At the beginning of the period, the managers invest in the safe or risky project. At
the end of the period, the managers of safe projects and successful risky projects con-
sume their output net of interest payments, the managers of failed projects consume
zero, and the intermediaries pay the interest r to consumers.
The sum of capital invested in the safe and risky projects is equal to the total
quantity of capital k. The division of k into capital in risky and safe projects occurs
within the period. We may view the total quantity of capital k, available in the
beginning of the period, as the result of an intertemporal maximization problem
in which consumers decide between consumption and savings. This intertemporal
problem is not important to us. The key equilibrium value is the interest rate given
the levels of x, h and k. The objective is to see how taking into account the ability
to run risky projects implies similar equilibrium interest rates across countries given
x, h and k for each country.6
5This financial contract is also considered in Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004). We could also
consider verification costs, but this is not essential for the results.
6The intertemporal problem is max
∑∞
t=0 β
tu (ct) s.t. ct + kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + rtkt, where kt is
the total quantity of capital in the beginning of each period.
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Solving the model
A manager with ability a decides whether to undertake a safe or a risky project.





y (ks)− rsks, π (a) [yH (kr)− rrkr]
}
. (1)
The left hand side has the profits if the safe project is undertaken. The right hand
side has the expected profits if the risky project is undertaken. The optimal quantity
of capital in the safe project is independent of the level of ability.7 The intermediary
offers the interest rate rs for the safe project and the contract (rr, kr) for the risky
project. As discussed above, it is not possible to offer kr according to the ability of the
manager because a is private information. The intermediary offers the same contract
for all managers willing to undertake the risky project. The level of capital in risky
projects is not exogenous. We determine kr in equilibrium. Private information is
not important for the results. I am focusing in the problem with private information
because it is more realistic and easier to discuss. Having full information, and so kr
as a function of a, does not change the conclusions of the paper.
There is a threshold ability level z such that the manager undertakes the safe
project if a < z, and undertakes the risky project if a ≥ z. z is such that
π (z) [yH (kr)− rrkr] = y (ks)− rsks. (2)
Given z, the measure of successful risky projects, Φ (z, x), and the measure of unsuc-
7The payment of human capital is not in the problem because each manager is endowed with
human capital. Another way of understanding why the payment of human capital is not in the
problem is to consider that managers take the level of human capital in the economy as given. A
higher h increases production in safe and risky projects, but managers cannot affect the level of h.
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cessful risky projects, Θ (z, x), are defined by
Φ (z, x) ≡
∫ 1
z
π (a) dF (a, x) and Θ (z, x) ≡
∫ 1
z
[1− π (a)] dF (a, x) . (3)
Assume that intermediaries and managers act competitively and that there is free
entry of intermediaries. With these assumptions, the equilibrium values of z, ks and
kr coincide with the values that maximize total expected output. Therefore, we obtain
z, ks and kr by maximizing total expected output,
max
z, ks, kr
F (z, x) y (ks) + Φ (z, x) yH (kr) + Θ (z, x) yL (kr) (4)
subject to the resource constraint
F (z, x) ks + [1− F (z, x)] kr = k. (5)
Once we find the optimal values of z, ks and kr, we obtain the interest rates rs and
rr by the marginal condition rs = y′ (ks) and by (2).
The first order conditions of this problem imply
ζ (z, x) y′H (kr) + [1− ζ (z, x)] y′L (kr) = y′ (ks) , (6)
y (ks)− λks ≥ π (z) yH (kr) + [1− π (z)] yL (kr)− λkr, (7)
where ζ (z, x) is the ratio between the number of successful projects to the total of
risky projects, ζ (z, x) ≡ Φ (z, x) / [1− F (z, x)], and λ is the Lagrange multiplier on
the resource constraint (5). The second equation solves with equality if 0 < z < 1.8
ζ (z, x) is increasing in z, as π is increasing in a. We will see below that ζ is also
increasing in the proxy for managerial ability x.
8If z = 0 then equation (7) changes to y (ks)− λks < π (0) yH (kr) + [1− π (0)] yL (kr)− λkr.
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Condition (6) equates the marginal product of risky and safe projects, the first
weighted by the fraction of successful and unsuccessful risky projects. Substituting
the functional forms of the production functions, it yields the ratio of capital used in













This ratio is important for our purposes because the rate of return to capital increases
if more managers engage in risky projects. This ratio is not constant in x because
x changes the distribution of managers and, therefore, changes z. The effect of
x disappears in the neoclassical model. This ratio is constant for a proportional
increase in AH , A and AL, by the homogeneity of the production function. kr/ks is
also constant in k or h. That is, if capital increases, with no increase in x, then the
quantities of capital in risky and safe projects increase in the same proportion. Rich
and poor countries have the same composition of risky and safe projects if there is
no increase in x.
If the fraction of successful risky projects ζ increases with x, then the ratio of
capital in risky projects to safe projects increases with x. The following proposition
guarantees this.
Proposition 1. The fraction of successful risky projects ζ (z, x) increases with the
proxy for managerial ability x. As a corollary, kr/ks is increasing in x.
The proof of ζx > 0 is involved because both the number of successful risky projects
Φ and the number of risky projects increases when x increases– the numerator and
denominator that define ζ. We need the probability π increasing in a and F (a, x′) to
first order stochastic dominate F (a, x) when x′ > x. A more technical condition is
that the density f is positive in the set of abilities, to avoid the possibility of ζ being
constant in x.
9







[π (z)− αζ (z, x)] AH
A




where kr/ks is given by (8), with equality if 0 < z < 1.
Recall that the ratio kr/ks does not depend on k or h and so the expression that
defines z does not depend directly on physical capital or human capital. Therefore,
z does not depend on k or h. z depends on the technology parameters and on the
proxy for managerial ability x. As kr/ks, z is constant for a proportional increase in
AH , A and AL.
The left-hand side of (9) is the ratio of expected profits from the risky project with
ability z to the profits from the safe project. z = 1 means that all agents undertake
the safe project. As AH > A, this cannot happen if the probability π (1) is close
enough to one. Analogously, z = 0 means that all agents undertake the risky project.
This can only happen if AL or π (0) are too high, that is, there are suffi cient gains
even if the project fails. This intuition is confirmed in the proposition below. We
can, therefore, easily have conditions to imply existence of z, 0 < z < 1.
Proposition 2. Existence of z, 0 < z < 1. Suppose that π (1) is suffi ciently close
to one and that AL/AH and π (0) are suffi ciently close to zero. Then, there exists a
threshold level of ability z, 0 < z < 1 such that equation (9) is satisfied with equality.
The ability of the managers in the threshold risky project, z, increases with the
proxy for managerial ability, zx > 0. Countries with more high-ability managers
use a manager with higher ability in the marginal project than countries with less
high-ability managers.9 Rauch (1991) obtains a similar result in a different model.
One of the objectives in Rauch (1991) is to show that countries with more skilled
9In Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004), in contrast, intermediation costs restrict the use of capital
in risky projects and imply higher managerial ability in the marginal project in countries with less
capital. I analyze further the different predictions in the next section.
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workers (richer countries) export managers and import skilled employees. The same
conclusions would apply to the present paper.
To show that z increases in x, define Λ as the left-hand side of (9). With 0 < z < 1,
z is given by Λ (z, x) = 1. Therefore, zx = −Λx/Λz. We have Λx < 0 in general and
Λz > 0 for certain conditions given below, usually valid. Intuitively, Λ decreases
with x because the ratio ζ of successful risky projects to the total of risky projects
increases when x increases, and so capital in risky projects increases. Therefore,
returns decrease in the marginal risky project relative to returns in the marginal safe
project. As a result, Λ decreases. Λz > 0 means that returns increase in the marginal
risky project relative to the returns in the marginal safe project when managerial
ability increases. With Λx < 0 and Λz > 0, zx > 0.
Proposition 3. z is increasing in x. Suppose that ζz < 1/α or, alternatively,
that the distribution of abilities is not concentrated in any level of ability (f (a, x) is
small). Then, the threshold ability level z increases with the proxy for managerial
ability, x.
Define Γ (x) as the ratio of the total quantity of capital to the capital used in safe
projects, Γ (x) = k/ks. By the resource constraint (5),
Γ (x) = F (z (x) , x) + [1− F (z (x) , x)] kr/ks. (10)
Γ is known once we have the equilibrium value of z in (9). We obtain the value of ks
by ks = k/Γ (x) and the value of kr by (8). We obtain rs and rr by rs = αAkα−1h1−α
and rr by (2). This completes the determination of the endogenous variables in the
model. We will see that Γ (x) summarizes how managerial ability affects total factor
productivity and how managerial abilities increases returns to capital.
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3. IMPLICATIONS: RETURNS TO CAPITAL
Returns to capital depend on the quantity of physical and human capital and on the
distribution of managerial abilities. A favorable distribution of managerial abilities
increases returns to capital. Economies with little capital may have low returns to
capital if it is diffi cult to find high-ability managers to run projects.
Revenues of intermediaries from safe and risky projects are given by




The first term in the right hand side are revenues from safe projects. The remaining
terms account for revenues from risky projects. The intermediary collects the output
of unsuccessful projects. We have rr given by equation (2) and rs = αAkα−1s h
1−α.
Substituting the values of the interest rates and using the expression of Γ in (10), we
have
rev = AΓ (x) kαs h
1−α − Akαs h1−α (1− α)
(




Returns to capital are defined as r = rev/k. Setting this value of r implies zero
profits for the intermediaries. To analyze the rate of return to capital, focus on the
first term in the expression of returns and substitute ks = k/Γ.10 We have
r ≈ AΓ (x)1−α k−(1−α)h1−α. (13)
Γ (x) summarizes the effect of the distribution of managerial abilities. As the proxy
for managerial ability increases, the value of Γ increases.
10The second term is the effect of private information. I use the approximation to explain the
mechanism of the model. The calibration and predictions that follow were obtained with the complete
expression in (12).
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AΓ (x)1−α is total factor productivity. To see this, consider the expression for total
output, y = F (z, x) ys (ks) + Φ (z, x) yH (kr) + Θ (z, x) yL (kr). This expression yields
y = AΓ (x)1−α kαh1−α (14)
Therefore, we can express differences in managerial ability as differences in TFP
in one closed form. TFP can be written as a function of managerial ability. The
contribution of the model is to provide a way to understand how managerial ability
increases TFP. TFP is higher because the number of risky projects increases with the
number of high ability managers.
Proposition 4. TFP increases with x. Suppose that zx is small or, alternatively,
that the distribution of abilities is not concentrated in any level of ability (f (a, x) is
small). Then, Γ (x) is increasing with x and hence TFP increases with x.
k and h do not affect Γ. If physical or human capital, however, have positive
correlation with factors that change the potential of managers to be successful in risky
projects, then the difference in returns to capital across countries changes. Richer
countries can have higher returns to capital. This is more likely to happen in middle-
income countries, which have a higher level of capital than poor countries but have a
much different distribution of managers. If managerial ability is imperfectly captured
by aggregate measures of physical and human capital, such as k and h, then the
variation of k and h alone cannot explain the variation in TFP.11
As Γ (x) = k/ks (x), when Γ increases then the quantity of capital invested in the
safe project ks decreases. The rate of return to capital depends on the number of risky
projects. By the formula of returns, r ≈ Ak−(1−α)s h1−α. If capital in safe projects
11Bils and Klenow (2000), Caselli (2005) and others find that physical and human capital alone
cannot explain the variation in TFP. There is also a discussion whether the direction of causality
is from human capital development (schooling) to growth or from growth to human capital. Bils
and Klenow (2000), Kumar (2003) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1996, 2004) discuss the direction of
causality and analyze further the relation among schooling, human capital and growth.
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increases, then returns to capital decrease. More high ability managers imply more
risky projects. Two economies with the same level of human capital and physical
capital can have different returns if they have different distributions of managerial
abilities. We know that the endowments of human capital and physical capital are
related to TFP. What we have here is an explanation for why human capital (in the
form of managerial ability) is positively correlated with TFP.
Numerical Analysis
Capital flows with little intensity. Capital flows from rich and poor countries to
middle-income countries. I explain this pattern by showing that returns to capital
can be close across countries and higher in middle-income countries. This happens in
the model because managerial ability increases TFP by the increase in risky projects.
To calculate the quantitative predictions of the model, I use data on physical cap-
ital and human capital in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997, 2005), on educational
attainment in Barro and Lee (2001), and on entrepreneurship from the Global En-
trepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (Reynolds et al. 2005). I first relate the distribution
of managerial abilities with physical capital, human capital and higher education. I
later relate the distribution of managerial abilities with indicators of entrepreneur-
ship. More human capital and physical capital increase the number of managers able
to be successful in a risky project. Human capital and physical capital– past invest-
ments in education or equipment– make management more effective, for example, by
improving management techniques and communication equipment. Moreover, Bates
(1990) finds a positive relation between years of higher education and entrepreneur-
ship.12 In the end of this section, I discuss further the relation between managerial
ability and education.
12Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare construct the measures of human capital from Barro and Lee. I use
directly the data of educational attainment in the specifications with higher education. See Lazear
(2005) for a theory of entrepreneurship. A different approach is to use the distribution of firm size to
infer the distribution of managerial talent (Lucas 1978). Data on firm size across countries, however,
is usually not comparable or not available, especially for low-income countries.
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Suppose that the distribution of managerial abilities is F (a, x) = ax, where x is
positively related to physical or human capital. Denote the level of physical and
human capital in country i by ki and hi, and the average number of years in higher
education by hyri. Consider six cases, depending on how x is related to the data:
x = hyri/hyr1, x = hi/h1, x = ki/k1, x = (hyri/hyr1)
1−α, x = (hi/h1)
1−α and
x = (ki/k1)
α, where i = 1 denotes the smallest values of hyr, h, or k. The first three
cases directly relate the proxy with higher education, human capital, and physical
capital. The other cases take into account the shares of human capital and physical
capital (I later relate x with indicators of entrepreneurship across countries, and
discuss how x can be related to institutions).
The distribution of abilities in the country with lowest physical or human capital
is uniform– F (a, x) = a when i = 1– and the distribution of abilities with higher
proxies first order stochastically dominates the distribution of abilities with lower
proxies. This specification highlights the main mechanism of the model to affect
returns to capital. It is easier to find a high-ability manager as human capital or
physical capital increase.
For simplicity, the probability of success in the risky project is linear, π (a) = a.





The assumption π (a) = a is intended to keep π the simplest as possible. It is possible
to replicate changes in π with changes in F . For example, an economy with higher
probability of success for each ability level (higher π (a)) may behave as an economy
with smaller probabilities of success but more high-ability managers.
The model transfers the explanation of capital flows from intermediation costs to
managerial ability. To make this clear, I first apply the same data of Imrohoroglu and
Kumar (2004) to the model, now with zero intermediation costs but with differences
in managerial ability. Imrohoroglu and Kumar use data from Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (1997), which calculate physical and human capital for 1985. I later update
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physical and human capital with Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005), which calculate
physical and human capital for 2000 (it does not change results), and I add evidence
on entrepreneurship to proxy for managerial ability.
The dataset of Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) has 98 countries in different
regions and with large differences in income and capital. The country with highest
physical capital per worker is Switzerland, with 1.79, 180 times the value of the coun-
try with lowest capital per worker, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly
Zaire), with 0.01. Capital per worker is normalized to the level of the United States,
with k = h = 1. The variation in human capital is also large. The highest human
capital per worker is 100 times the lowest human capital per worker (in the United
States, with 1, and in Niger, with 0.01).
Following the procedure of Imrohoroglu and Kumar, I grouped the countries in
four quartiles from the lowest to the highest physical capital per worker: i refers now
to a quartile, and ki, hi and hyri refer to the averages of physical capital, human
capital and years of higher education of each quartile. We have then four points,
each representing a group of 22 countries.13 What I refer to as poor countries are
the countries in the lowest quartile. The middle-income countries are the countries in
the second and third quartiles, and the rich countries are the countries in the highest
quartile. Two countries in the first quartile are Tanzania and Ghana– 18 of the 22
countries in the first quartile are in Africa. Examples of two countries in the other
quartiles are Honduras and Indonesia in the second, Brazil and South Korea in the
third, and Denmark and the United States in the fourth. The countries are ordered
by capital per worker because capital is the relevant variable for returns to capital
in the neoclassical model. The order of countries in income per capita is almost the
13Following the procedure of Imrohoroglu and Kumar, I also removed 10 countries with high TFP
levels, probably caused by measurement problems. The countries are Algeria, Congo, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Mexico, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela. The values of k, h and hyr of
each quartile are ki = 0.024, 0.086, 0.279, 1.033 (rounded to 0.025, 0.1, 0.275, 1); hi = 0.049, 0.150,
0.394, 1; and hyri = 0.042, 0.204, 0.387, 0.659.
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same, the correlation of the logs of capital and income per worker is 0.96.
The variety of countries is an advantage of the dataset of Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare. We later use the dataset of Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and, as mentioned above,
the GEM dataset (both described later). These two datasets have less countries, and
the countries are concentrated in the highest quartiles of Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare. There are no countries of the lowest quartile in Caselli and Feyrer and there
is only one country of the lowest quartile (Uganda) in the GEM dataset.
I assume that the capital share α is equal to 0.35 and the depreciation rate is equal
to 9 percent in all countries. For the productivity parameters AH , A and AL, I set
AL = 0 and calculate AH and A such that the net return is equal to 7 percent and
the capital-output ratio is equal to 3 in the richest quartile.14 See appendix for the
calibrated values of AH and A. I keep the corresponding values of AH and A fixed
in each specification and vary the values of physical and human capital. Returns are
calculated by ri = revi/ki, where the intermediary’s revenue revi is given by (12).
Figure 1 shows the results. The figure has seven lines, six for each proxy of x and
one for the neoclassical model, with x = 1. Each line has four points, for each capital
quartile in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). (The figure with data from Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) is similar. It is in Fig 2.) According to the model, returns
to capital in all countries are between 6 and 10 percent, with higher returns in middle-
income countries (third quartile). This pattern appears in all six specifications with
managerial ability. The model predicts much closer returns across countries than
the neoclassical model. Returns closer across countries imply that capital flows with
low intensity. Higher returns in middle-income countries imply that capital flows to
14Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004) also follow this calibration. The difference is that they do not
vary the distribution of abilities as income increases. They explain the pattern of capital flows by
the introduction of intermediation costs e in each country. In comparison to their model, I set e = 0
and explain changes in returns on capital with changes in managerial abilities. Their model collapses
to the neoclassical model when e = 0. The present model collapses to the neoclassical model when
x does not vary across countries.
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x = 1 (Neoclassical)
Fig. 1. Net returns to capital (r − δ) for different assumptions about the proxy x.
Neoclassical: y = Akαh1−α. Capital per worker obtained from grouping the countries
in quartiles and normalizing to the level of the richest quartile, data from Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997). Human capital for each quartile: hi = 0.049, 0.150, 0.394,
and 1. The model is calibrated to imply returns of 7 percent in the highest quartile.
middle-income countries. More precisely, the model predicts that capital flows with
low intensity to countries in the third quartile of capital per worker.
The neoclassical returns in figure 1, calculated with x = 1 for all quartiles, take
into account human capital in the production function, as in Lucas (1990). Without
human capital, returns go much beyond the limits of the figure. Even with human
capital, the neoclassical model predicts that net returns in the lowest quartile are
more than twice the net returns in the richest quartile.
All deviations from the neoclassical model are the result of changes in the distrib-
ution of managerial abilities. According to the specification of x, the median of the
distribution of abilities increases from 0.5, in the lowest quartile, to around 0.9 in
the highest quartile.15 Is this variation excessive? According to the data, the level of
15The median in the highest quartile varies from 0.83 when x = (ki/k1)
α to 0.98 when x = ki/k1.
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human capital in the highest quartile is 20 times the level in the lowest quartile, and
the corresponding level of physical capital is 40 times the level in the lowest quartile.
Educational quality increases even more the difference in human capital (Hanushek
and Woessmann 2007). It would not be a surprise to see substantial differences in
the distribution of managerial abilities across countries. It is possible that the true
distributions of abilities are such that poor countries have even fewer high-ability
managers as compared to rich countries than I assume in these exercises.16
Table 1 shows gross returns (not discounting depreciation) relative to returns in
the highest quartile of capital per worker. In the neoclassical model, returns in the
first quartile are 11 times higher than returns in the highest quartile. The differ-
ence decreases to 1.55 times when we add human capital to the production function.
Returns are much closer when we add the effect of the distribution of managerial
abilities. Returns in middle-income countries exceed those in poor and rich countries.
Returns are lowest in poor countries under the specifications with x = hyri/hyr1,
x = (hyri/hyr1)
1−α, x = hi/h1 and x = ki/k1 but not under x = (hi/h1)
1−α and
x = (ki/k1)
α. This occurs because the proxy varies less in the last two specifications.
The highest returns are for countries in the third quartile.
The reason for the increase in returns to capital from the first to the third quartile is
the increase in the relative number of risky projects. Risky projects, if successful, are
more productive than safe projects. Countries with more high-ability managers ben-
efit more from the risky technology. There are more risky projects in economies with
more high-ability managers, although both technologies are available in all countries.
16The flow of managers from rich to poor countries could increase returns in poor countries.
The implicit assumption is that there are factors such as local knowledge (as culture or language),
externalities in ability, or fixed costs (as diffi culty in matching jobs for family members) that make
diffi cult the migration of managers across countries.
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Table 1. Gross Returns Relative to the Highest Quartile and Share of Risky Projects
Neoclassical αiAk 1/ hyrhyrx i= 1/ hhx i= 1/ kkx i=
k Return Return Share Return Share Return Share
0.025 11.0 0.95 41.0% 0.94 39.8% 0.93 37.7%
0.100 4.47 1.08 89.9% 0.96 76.3% 0.98 82.3%
0.275 2.31 1.18 98.3% 1.12 96.8% 1.13 98.6%
1.000 1.00 1.00 99.9% 1.00 100.0% 1.00 100.0%
Neoclassical αα −1ii hAk
α−= 11)/( hyrhyrx i
α−= 11)/( hhx i
α)/( 1kkx i=
k Return Return Share Return Share Return Share
0.025 1.55 1.03 48.2% 1.02 46.7% 1.12 53.4%
0.100 1.30 1.09 81.4% 0.99 70.7% 1.05 69.4%
0.275 1.26 1.17 91.2% 1.11 88.3% 1.12 80.2%
1.000 1.00 1.00 96.2% 1.00 97.3% 1.00 90.9%
x: proxy for managerial ability. Neoclassical: model with x=1 for all quartiles. Share of risky
projects in the neoclassical cases: 69.6 percent. The model is calibrated so that gross returns in
the highest quartile are 0.16. Source of k: Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997).
As risky and safe technologies are available in all countries, the risky technology
should require approximately the same minimum level of managerial ability in all
countries. That level of ability, z, equates expected profits in risky and safe projects.
A biotechnology company in the United States and in India would require approxi-
mately the same minimum level of managerial ability. We showed, however, that z
increases with x. To reconcile the intuition that risky projects should require approx-
imately the same minimum managerial ability, the effect of x on z must be small.
The simulations confirm the intuition. z does not increase much, about 2 percent,
from 0.673 to 0.686, with x = hyri/hyr1 (the values are similar for the other proxies)
from the poorest to the richest quartile. The manager with lowest ability in the
risky project has similar ability in rich and poor countries. This prediction does not
mean that the average ability in risky projects is the same in both countries. Rich
countries have more high ability managers above the minimum level. The prediction
means that innovative companies in poor and rich countries require approximately the
same minimum level of managerial ability, slightly more in rich countries. There are
less innovative projects in poor countries. When they exist, however, their managers
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can communicate with the managers in rich countries, as they have similar abilities.
The opposite prediction about z happens in Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004). When
risky projects pay intermediation costs, z increases to equate expected profits in risky
and safe projects. The effect of intermediation costs is weaker with more capital, and
so z decreases when capital increases: rich countries have managers with lower ability
in risky projects than poor countries. In the present paper, with frictionless credit,
z does not change if k or h increases. z increases if the distribution of managers is
more favorable (when x increases). As x is positively correlated with k, the model
here implies that z increases when capital increases. We should expect countries with
more high-ability managers to increase z. These countries use more capital in risky
projects and should increase z to equate profits in risky and safe projects.17
The simulations imply that z increases little: for those in risky projects, managerial
ability in rich and poor countries is approximately the same.18 Risky, innovative
companies should compete internationally. Even though the general distribution of
abilities is different, it is plausible to expect managers to have approximately the same
ability once the project is undertaken if the technology is the same across countries.
In addition to gross returns, table 1 shows the share of output produced from risky
projects relative to total output. Countries with more high-ability managers use
their capital to fund more risky projects. This has a positive effect on returns. The
model predicts that poor countries tend to adopt safe technologies, usually available
in traditional sectors, while rich countries tend to adopt new, risky technologies. In
support of this prediction, Vandenbussche et al. (2006) find that countries with more
skilled workers are closer to the technological frontier. These countries adopt newer
17Rauch (1991), in a different model, gives additional intuition for having z higher in richer
countries.
18z increases little because the effect of x is indirect. x increases the fraction of successful risky
projects, ζ, which then increases capital in risky projects and increases z. The positive effect of x
on z can be made stronger if the probability of sucess in risky projects increases fast when ability
increases (π′ (a) large).
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and riskier technologies.
The returns in figure 1 and table 1 agree with the empirical estimations of Caselli
and Feyrer (2007). In an independent study, Caselli and Feyrer find returns to cap-
ital of 6.9 percent in poor countries and 8.4 percent in rich countries. I find returns
between 6 and 10 percent, shown in figure 1. With the standard deviations calcu-
lated by Caselli and Feyrer (1.9 percent for rich countries and 3.7 percent for poor
countries), the estimations of returns to capital are between 3.2 and 10.6 percent
for poor countries and 6.5 and 10.3 percent for rich countries, consistent with figure
1. (These values also agree with Fig. 2, with the more recent data of Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare 2005.) Considering gross returns, by adding the depreciation of 0.06
in Caselli and Feyrer, gross returns in rich countries are 1.12 times the gross returns
in poor countries. Again, a number consistent with the model with managerial ability
in table 1.
Rich countries in Caselli and Feyrer are the countries with income per worker from
Portugal and higher and poor countries are the countries from Malaysia and lower.
To compare predictions and estimations for each quartile in figure 1, I arranged the
countries in Caselli and Feyrer in the quartiles used here. South Korea, for example,
is in both datasets and it is in the third quartile (from the 53 countries in Caselli and
Feyrer, this arrangement implies 20 countries in the richest quartile, 12 in the third,
and 10 in the second, no country of the poorest quartile is in the dataset of Caselli and
Feyrer19). The average of the estimations in Caselli and Feyrer for each quartile are
8.1, 8.3, and 8.3 for the richest, third and second quartiles. Approximately the same
for all quartiles, 8 percent. The estimations in Caselli and Feyrer for each quartile
would appear as a straight line in figure 1, passing through 8 percent. As the model
19The number of countries decreased from 53 to 42 because I dropped seven countries that were
among the 10 countries that I had dropped from the dataset of Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, and
because four countries in Caselli and Feyrer were not in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (Burundi, Cote
d’Ivoire, Egypt, and Morocco).
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x = 1 (Neoclassical)
Fig. 2. Net returns to capital. Same procedure as in figure 1, with data from Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (2005). Human capital calculated with the procedure to obtain
BK4, as in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), the same measure used in figure 1
and in Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2004). Physical capital for each quartile: ki = 0.020,
0.102, 0.401, 1. Human capital for each quartile: hi = 0.0354, 0.143, 0.523, 1. Physical
and human capital normalized by the highest quartile.
predicts returns to capital between 6 and 10 percent, the predictions of the model
agree with the data.20
I find returns to capital consistent with the estimates of Caselli and Feyrer but they
explain the small difference in returns across countries in a different way. In Caselli
and Feyrer, the difference in returns is small because poor countries have more land
in the production function and agriculture is more important in GDP. Here, the
difference in returns is small because high-ability managers in poor countries are
more diffi cult to find. The two explanations are related. If in poor countries there
20I also calculated output per worker for the four quartiles using the proxies for managerial ability.
According to the data in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), output per worker from the first to
the fourth quartile is 1.0, 2.7, 6.0, 13.5, normalized by the first quartile. The model predicts larger
variation in output per worker. The proxy with higher education, for example, implies output per
worker of 1.0, 3.9, 11.2, and 33.6 (the different proxies imply similar results, the average across
proxies is 1.0, 3.7, 10.8, and 32.9).
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are not institutions that allow agents to keep the output of their work, or if there
are institutions that block entrepreneurial behavior, then agents will not invest in
managerial ability. It will be harder to find high-ability managers and traditional
sectors, such as agriculture, will be more important in these countries.
What is the direct evidence on managerial ability across countries? I have used so
far physical capital, human capital and years of higher education to define proxies
for managerial ability. The advantage is that data for k, h, and hyr exist for many
countries and, as these variables have been used extensively in other applications,
we know more precisely their properties. But it is useful to use direct measures of
managerial ability, even if we have data for less countries.
I now use a direct measure of managerial ability. The data is from the Global En-
trepreneurship Monitor (GEM). The GEM produces a database on entrepreneurship
comparable across countries. Its first survey was in 1999, with 10 countries, and its
most recent survey, in 2007, had 42 countries. The GEM asks the same questions
to a sample of two thousand individuals in each country. It defines an entrepreneur
as someone creating a firm or an owner and manager of a new firm (firms up to 3.5
years old). Reynolds et al. (2005) describe the implementation of GEM and discuss
the survey questions and the reliability of the dataset. Ardagna and Lusardi (2008)
discuss further the reliability of the GEM dataset.
I focus on the indices of total entrepreneurship activity out of necessity (teanec),
and total entrepreneurship activity to pursue an opportunity (teaopp). The total
entrepreneurship activity is the ratio of entrepreneurs to the number of individuals
in the sample. The question “You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start
a new business, including any self-employment or selling any goods or services to
others?,” as it is in Reynolds et al. (2005) (and other questions to assure that the
initiative is recent and that the person took actions to start the business), identify an
entrepreneur. All indices restrict to individuals aged 18 to 64. An advantage of having
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interviews instead of governmental records is the inclusion of firms in the formal and
informal sectors and of people creating a business without having it registered yet.
“Are you involved in this start-up/firm to take advantage of a business opportunity
or because you have no better choices of work?,”identify the activity as for necessity
or opportunity.
I relate managerial ability in the model to entrepreneurship for opportunity. Risky
projects in the model are potentially more productive– they have AH > A– but
represent new technologies with a risk of producing zero. Countries with more en-
trepreneurs for opportunity than for necessity have more managers that choose the
risky project and so have more high ability managers.
The entrepreneurship indices for necessity and opportunity behave in different ways
in poor and rich countries. Total entrepreneurship activity and the indices teanec and
teaopp are larger in poor countries (probably because poor countries have a larger
informal sector and more small firms), but entrepreneurship for opportunity is more
frequent than entrepreneurship for necessity in rich countries: the ratio teaopp/teanec
is higher in rich countries. Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) regress the entrepreneurship
indices on education and other individual characteristics. They find that entrepre-
neurs for opportunity have more education and more confidence in their skills than
entrepreneurs for necessity.
Let the proxy for managerial ability in a country be now defined as the ratio
teaopp/teanec. I use the GEM surveys from 2001 to 2004 (the questionnaire is more
comparable across years after 2001, the data for 2004 is the most recent available on
public domain). I match the countries in the GEM dataset to the countries in the
quartiles of Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), I obtain 35 countries. As in Caselli
and Feyrer, the dataset is concentrated in the richer countries. From the 22 countries
in each quartile of Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, there are 21 countries in the richest
quartile in the GEM dataset, and 11, 2 and 1 country in the third, second, and first
25
quartiles. The two countries in the second quartile are Thailand and India. The single
country in the first quartile is Uganda. Each country has at most four observations,
one for each survey from 2001 to 2004. Taking each observation as a country in each
year implies 108 observations, 75 for the richest quartile and 28, 3, and 2 observations
for the other quartiles. I define proxies for each quartile with the 35 countries and
with the 108 observations in countries and years of surveys. It makes difference, as
there are little observations for the first and second quartile.
Let gi be the average of the ratio teaopp/teanec for each quartile. I define x = gi/g1,
in the same way as for the proxies with h, k, and hyr, and recalibrate the model with
the data from GEM.21 I obtain net returns to capital from the poorest to the richest
quartile of 7.3, 8.3, 6.8, and 7.0 percent, with the 35 countries, and 7.3, 7.4, 6.7,
and 7.0 percent with the 108 observations. The main difference is the return in the
second quartile, smaller with 108 observations. The reason is that Thailand is an
outlier with teaopp/teanec equal to 5.5, with one survey in 2002, well above the
teaopp/teanec of India, the other available country in the second quartile, equal to
1.9 and 0.8 with surveys in 2002 and 2001. Among the 35 countries, Thailand is the
15th in teaopp/teanec, just above U.K. (with 5.3) and Ireland (with 5.2). With 35
countries or 108 observations, the returns are consistent with the results in figure 1.
The peak of returns is now in the second quartile, but the difference in returns across
quartiles is small. Moreover, the number of countries in the third and second quartiles
decreased from 22 to 11 countries in the third and 2 countries in the second quartile,
which decreases the precision of the point estimates and increases the probability of
having similar returns to capital, about seven percent for all countries. The returns
21With the 35 countries, the teaopp/teanec for a country is the average of the four surveys for
each year, I then take the average of the countries in each quartile to obtain gi. With the 108
observations in country and years of surveys, I take the average of the observations for each quartile.
With the 35 countries, gi = 1.15, 3.40, 2.59, 7.78 from the poorest to the richest quartile. With the
108 observations, gi = 1.15, 2.71, 2.56, 7.96. A and AH are similar for the two specifications, the
values in the appendix are for the 108 observations.
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agree with the previous findings, but the results are sharper by avoiding the effect of
outliers, as we see next.
To avoid the effect of outliers, I calculated gi with income per capita for each
quartile and the coeffi cients of the regression of teaopp/teanec of each country on
income per capita.22 I found returns to capital equal to 6.1, 7.0, 9.2, and 7.0 percent.
The peak of returns, in this case, is back to the third quartile. The pattern of returns
is very similar to the pattern with the other proxies in figure 1. Using the GEM
dataset does not change the conclusions obtained with the other proxies.
Additional evidence on managerial ability across countries comes from the increas-
ing literature about the effect of managerial ability on firm value. Bloom and Van
Reenen (2007) find a large spread in management practices across medium firms in
U.S., U.K., France and Germany. One of the most important factors to explain the
dispersion of managerial ability is the transmission of control. They find that family-
owned firms in which the Chief Executive Offi cer is the eldest male child tend to have
lower indicators of managerial ability. Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) state that it is
more common to have the transmission of ownership and control from one generation
to the other in poor countries.23 Combined with the evidence that firms managed by
the descendants of the owner have lower managerial ability, they argue that we should
expect lower managerial ability in poorer countries. Gabaix and Landier (2008), on
the other hand, calibrate their model with a very low dispersion of managerial ability.
They focus on managerial abilities of the top CEOs (the CEOs of the largest firms)
to study executive compensation. The managers in the present model, however, are
all managers in a country, not only the top CEOs, and we should expect a higher dis-
persion of managerial ability for the whole population of managers. The evidence in
22The values of gi with this procedure are 0.36, 1.37, 3.22, 7.58.
23See the references in Bloom and Van Reenen and Caselli and Gennaioli for the forms of transmis-
sion of ownership and control across countries, and for additional evidence on the impact of family
control on firm value and managerial ability.
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these papers agrees with the indicators in the GEM dataset. I use the GEM dataset
in the simulations because it has more comparable data across countries and more
countries.
Before using the GEM dataset, I defined proxies for x based on human capital, phys-
ical capital and years of higher education. Is education a good proxy for managerial
ability? I discuss this question in more detail now. I add evidence from Ardagna
and Lusardi (2008), Wadhwa et al. (2008), and Cascio et al. (2008). Ardagna and
Lusardi, as mentioned above, find that entrepreneurs for opportunity have more edu-
cation. In more detail, the variables for high school and college are positively related
to entrepreneurship for opportunity and negatively related to entrepreneurship for
necessity. These results are controlled for income (income is positively related to en-
trepreneurship for opportunity). Wadhwa et al., in a study on the founders of firms
of computers, bioscience, software and other related areas, find that 92 percent of the
founders have at least college and 47 percent have master’s or doctoral degrees. They
find that college graduates founded firms with two times the revenues and the number
of employees of firms founded by those with high school only, another evidence on the
relation of education and managerial ability. Cascio et al. find that higher education
is more important than total years of education to increase proficiency on arithmetic,
reading and the ability to use information, skills usually related to managerial ability.
This finding agrees with the sharp predictions in figure 1 when using higher education
as proxy.
I end this section by discussing the link between managerial ability and institutions.
What moves the distribution of managerial ability? Institutions or other factors such
as human capital or physical capital? Put simply, forcing people to study will not
increase the number of high-ability managers.24 Managerial ability is defined as the
24Or, as Easterly (2001, p. 73) writes: “Having the government force you to go to school does not
change your incentives to invest in the future.”
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probability of being successful in risky projects. Learning to increase the probability of
being successful in risk projects requires taking conscious actions toward this purpose.
Institutions affect actions. Murphy et al. (1991) present a model in which agents
use their talents in productive activities, such as innovation, or in activities that do
not produce but only redistribute wealth, such as rent seeking. If agents believe that
they cannot keep the profits from their activities– if institutions cannot guarantee
these rights– then they will use their talents in rent seeking rather than in innovation.
Pritchett (2001, 2006) finds little evidence that growth in education implies economic
growth. As he points out, one explanation is that, in accordance with the model
of Murphy et al., education may be biased for unproductive activities. Education
increases growth only if educated people work in productive activities.
In the same way, agents use education to increase managerial ability if the insti-
tutions in place encourage entrepreneurship. Dias and McDermott (2006) present a
model that emphasizes this mechanism. In their model, better institutions increase
the supply of entrepreneurs. Moreover, education raises the number of entrepreneurs,
but it is not as effective as better institutions. Dias and McDermott also find evidence
that economies with more entrepreneurs have more demand for education.
Therefore, what moves the distribution of ability is, ultimately, institutions. In the
simulations, I use human capital, physical capital, higher education, and entrepre-
neurship for x instead of using institutions. The variables that I used, however, are
positively related to institutions. Good institutions in place for a long time imply high
levels of human capital, physical capital, higher education, and entrepreneurship.
Desai et al. (2003) and Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) find evidence that institutions
affect entrepreneurship. Desai et al., in a sample of European countries, find that less
corruption and more protection of property rights increase rates of entry, decrease
rates of exit, and lower average firm size. Ardagna and Lusardi, with the GEM
dataset, find that more effi cient judicial systems and less stringent entry and labor
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market regulations increase entrepreneurship for opportunity. If agents believe that
they can start a new business to pursue an opportunity, they will investment in
managerial ability. The model presented here takes managerial ability as given to
show that more managerial ability implies higher returns to capital. But the decision
to invest in managerial ability is a result of institutions. An extension of the model is
to include the decision to invest in managerial ability. Agents will invest in managerial
ability if they have incentives to do so.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper shows how managerial ability can increase total factor productivity
and explain capital flows. Managerial ability increases the number of risky projects.
All countries have access to the same technology and the technology has decreasing
returns to capital. Nevertheless, returns in poor countries are smaller than returns in
rich countries. The availability of high-ability managers compensates the decreasing
productivity of capital.
I construct proxies for managerial ability with physical capital, human capital, years
of higher education, and indicators of entrepreneurship. Returns are close across
countries, the model predicts, and middle-income countries have higher returns to
capital than poor and rich countries.
The model also explains why capital flows have maintained their pattern although
financial innovation decreased intermediation costs. As it is more diffi cult to increase
managerial ability, richer countries can have higher returns to capital if their distrib-
ution of managerial abilities is more favorable.
One way to understand the results is that there are no frictions for capital move-
ments but there are relevant frictions for the movement of managerial ability. One
extension of the model is to allow capital flows to combine flows of capital and man-
agerial ability. In this way, we can look for predictions on the flows of managerial
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ability across countries. Another important direction for research is to understand
why agents would not invest in their managerial abilities in poor countries. Institu-
tions are probably important for investment in managerial abilities. There will be
entrepreneurs only if there are institutions that enable them to exist.
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APPENDIX
Proposition 1. ζ (z, x) is increasing in x. Proof. As π is positive and increasing,
by the mean value theorem for integrals, there exists a c, z ≤ c ≤ 1, such that
Φ (z, x) =
∫ 1
z
π (a) f (a, x) da = π (c, x)
∫ 1
z
f (a, x) da, where x is written in π (c, x) to
emphasize the dependency of c on the distribution function. Then,
ζ (z, x) ≡ Φ (z, x)




f (a, x) da∫ 1
z
f (a, x) da
= π (c, x) .
So, we have to prove that c increases when x increases. Define c1 as the value of
c such that π (c1)
∫ 1
z
f (a, x1) da =
∫ 1
z
π (a) f (a, x1) da, and analogously for c2. We
have, for x2 > x1,
∆Φ ≡ Φ (z, x2)− Φ (z, x1) = π (c2)
∫ 1
z
f (a, x2) da− π (c1)
∫ 1
z
f (a, x1) da > 0,
where the expression is greater than zero by first order stochastic dominance.
Rewrite ∆Φ as






f (a, x2) da−
∫ 1
z
f (a, x1) da
]
.
We have that π (c2) = π (c1) + ∆π for some ∆π. We have to prove that ∆π > 0. This
implies that π (c2) > π (c1) and so c2 > c1 as π is increasing. Using π (c2) = π (c1)+∆π
in the equation above yields
∆Φ = π (c1)
[∫ 1
z
f (a, x2) da−
∫ 1
z





f (a, x2) da
]
⇒ ∆Φ = π (c1)
∫ 1
z
[f (a, x2) da− f (a, x1)] da+ ∆π
∫ 1
z
f (a, x2) da. (15)
Also,
∆Φ ≡ Φ (z, x2)− Φ (z, x1) =
∫ 1
z
π (a) f (a, x2) da−
∫ 1
z




π (a) [f (a, x2)− f (a, x1)] da. (16)
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Equating (15) and (16) implies∫ 1
z
π (a) [f (a, x2)− f (a, x1)] da = π (c1)
∫ 1
z








[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x2) da =
∫ 1
z
[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x1) da+∆π
∫ 1
z




[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x2) da = ∆π
∫ 1
z




[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x1) da = 0 by the definition of c1.
Looking for a contradiction, suppose that ∆π = π (c2)− π (c1) ≤ 0. Then∫ 1
z
[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x2) da ≤ 0. (18)
However, as F (a, x2) first order stochastically dominates F (a, x1),∫ 1
0
[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x2) da >
∫ 1
0
[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x1) da = 0,
as π (a)− π (c1) is increasing in [0, 1]. Therefore,∫ z
0
[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x2) da+
∫ 1
z
[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x2) da > 0. (19)
For the strict inequality, we have to assume that f is positive in [0, z]. According to
(18), in order to have (19) we must have∫ z
0
[π (a)− π (c1)] f (a, x2) da > 0.
This implies ∫ z
0
π (a) f (a, x2) da > π (c1)
∫ z
0
f (a, x2) da.
But, we know that π (z)
∫ z
0
f (a, x2) da >
∫ z
0




f (a, x2) da > π (c1)
∫ z
0
f (a, x2) da⇒ π (z) > π (c1) .
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f (a, x1) da =
∫ 1
z
π (a) f (a, x1) da⇒ π (c1) ≥ π (z) ,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we have to accept that
∆π > 0⇒ π (c2) > π (c1)⇒ ζ (z, x2) > ζ (z, x1) .
Corollary. The ratio of capital in risky projects to capital in safe projects is
increasing in x.










θx (z, x) > 0 if and only if ζx (AH/A− AL/A) > 0, which is true as ζx > 0 and
AH > AL.
Results for propositions 2, 3 and 4
1. ζ (z, x) > π (z) if π is increasing. Used in propositions 2, 3 and 4.
ζ (z, x) ≡
∫ 1
z
π (a) f (a, x) da/
∫ 1
z
f (a, x) da. As π is positive and increasing, there
exists a c, z < c < 1, such that ζ (z, x) = π (c)
∫ 1
z
f (a, x) da/
∫ 1
z
f (a, x) da = π (c) >
π (z). If π (z) ≥ z we also have ζ > z. As ζ is increasing in x, then ζ (z, x > 1) >
ζ (z, 1) > π (z).
2. θ ≡ kr/ks > 1 if AL is suffi ciently small. Used in proposition 4.
This property says that the quantity of capital in risky projects is higher than
the quantity used in safe projects. By the equilibrium condition Λ = 1, we have,
if AL = 0,
1
1− αθ
α (π (z)− αζ) AH
A
= 1, θ ≡ kr/ks. By (8), AH/A = θ1−αζ−1.
Therefore, θ =
1− α
π (z) /ζ − α > 1 as ζ > π and π/ζ − α > 0 by the equilibrium
condition. By continuity, this condition is also true if AL is suffi ciently close to zero.
Proposition 2. Existence of z, 0 < z < 1. Proof. Define Λ (z, x) as the left-hand
side of (9). Λ is the ratio of the expected profits from the risky project with ability
z to the profit from the safe project. The strategy of the proof is to show that we
have Λ (1, x) > 1, if π (1) is suffi ciently high, and Λ (0, x) < 0, if AL/AH and π (0)
are suffi ciently small. As Λ (z, x) is continuous, there exists a z, 0 < z < 1. These
conditions are met, for example, with π (a) = a and AL = 0.
For Λ (1, x) > 1. We have limz→1 ζ (z, x) = −Φ′ (z) /F ′ (z) = π (1) > 0. Then









> 1 if π (1) is suffi ciently close to
one.
For Λ (0, x) < 0. We have ζ(0, x) =
∫ 1
0
π (a) f (a, x) da > 0. Then, as kr/ks > 0,
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Λ (0, x) < 0 if and only if [π (0)− αζ (0, x)] AH
AL
+ [(1− π (0))− α (1− ζ (0, x))] < 0.
The second term in the left-hand side is positive as ζ (z, x) > π (z). Therefore,




αζ (0, x)− π (0)
1− π (0)− α (1− ζ (0, x)) . This condition is satisfied
if AL/AH and π (0) are suffi ciently close to zero.
Proposition 3. z is increasing in x. Proof. Consider that 0 < z < 1. Therefore,
z is given by Λ (z, x) = 1, where Λ is the left-hand side of (9), and zx = −Λx/Λz.
Λx < 0 in general and Λz > 0 for certain conditions given below. Hence zx > 0.
a. Λx < 0


















+ [1− π (z)] AL
A






















θ1−α = − (ζ − π (z)) (AH/A− AL/A) < 0, as ζ > π (z). Therefore, Λx (z, h) < 0.
b. Λz > 0
Recall that the first order conditions imply Λ (z, x) = 1. We have Λ (0, x) < 0
and Λ (1, x) > 1. If z is unique, then Λ in increasing in its first argument in the
neighborhood of z and so Λz > 0. In all functional forms considered in this paper, z
is unique. But there can be particular forms of f (a, x) such that z is not unique. In
this case, the maximum of the objective function must be for the smallest z such that
Λ (z, x) = 1 because, with this, there are more managers that undertake the risky
project (I present a formal argument below). As Λ (0, x) < 0, the smallest z for which
Λ (z, x) = 1 is such that Λ is increasing in z in its neighborhood and so Λz > 0.
The formal argument that follows presents a condition to imply Λz > 0. We





(z − αζ) AH
A
+ [(1− z)− α (1− ζ)] AL
A
]
. For the opti-
































[(1− αζz) θ + αζz].








θ − 1 > 1
and usually ζz < 1 (in particular, limz→1 ζz = 1/2). But it can be the case that ζz > 1















1− 1/θ if and only
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1− 1/θ > 1,
1






> 0. If we have multiple z’s, the smallest one will be such that
1−F (z) is large. So, this condition is probably always met although [1− F (z)] /f (z)
may be smaller than 1. Another way of having the inequality above is assuming that
the distribution of abilities is not concentrated in any level of ability and so f (z) is
small. A suffi cient condition is simply ζz < 1/α.
Proposition 4. TFP is increasing in x. Proof. TFP is equal to AΓ (x)1−α. So,
we have to prove that Γ (x) is increasing in x. As Γ (x) = k/ks (x), this property
says that the quantity of capital invested in the safe project decreases with x, as
stated in the text. As Γ (z, x) = F (z, x) + [1− F (z, x)] θ, we have two effects of
the increase in x. The first effect is the direct increase in θ, as θx > 0, and the
decrease in F , as Fx < 0. The decrease in F has a net positive effect because
Fx − Fxθ = −Fx (θ − 1) > 0, as θ > 1. Therefore, the first effect is positive. The
second effect is caused by the increase in z implied by zx > 0. Formally, Γx > 0 if
and only if [1− F (z, x)] (θzzx + θx)− (θ − 1)Fx > f (z, x) zx. If zx > 0 is small, or if
f (z, x) is small (f is not concentrated in any particular ability) then this condition is




Table A.1. Calibrated values of AH and A
x AH A AH /A
α−1
1)/( hyrhyri 0.3860 0.2360 1.64
α−1
1)/( hhi 0.3788 0.2356 1.61
α)/( 1kki 0.4148 0.2377 1.74
1/ hyrhyri 0.3543 0.2349 1.51
1/ hhi 0.3497 0.2348 1.49
1/ kki 0.3417 0.2348 1.46
1/ gg i 0.3799 0.2357 1.61
x = 1 (Neoclassic) 0.5459 0.2462 2.22
The values of AH and A were calibrated so that gross returns are equal to 16 percent per year and
k/y = 3 in the highest quartile. AL = 0 in all specifications.
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